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State Ownership, Institutional Effects and Value Creation of Cross-border  
  Mergers & Acquisitions by Chinese Firms 
 
1. Introduction  
Cross-border mergers & acquisitions (CBM&A) activities from emerging market 
economies have paralleled their home countries economic reforms and integration 
into the world economy (Aybar and Ficici, 2009). This is in sharp contrast to the past 
when firms from developed countries have dominated the global market for corporate 
control and emerging economies were only recipients for these investments. For 
example, the value of Chinese CBM&As purchase which stood at $185 million 
dollars in 1991 has risen up to $34,355 million in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012). The rise in 
outward CBM&As is partly attributed to market reforms as previous institutional 
arrangements in emerging market economies did not facilitate economic exchange 
and competition in the global market (Spicer et al., 2000; Rondinelli and Behrman, 
2000). Institutions which are defined as “the rules of the game” help shape the 
structures, influence strategic choices and competitiveness of firms (North, 1990; 
Fligstein, 1996). Prior studies in the context of China have documented the effects of 
institutional pressures and constraints on firms’ strategic choices and financing (Cai, 
1999; Hitt et al., 2004; Tsui et al., 2004; Hsiang-Chun and Bo, 2012). Institutions 
within an economy is to reduce both transaction and information costs by reducing 
uncertainty, establish a stable structure that facilitates interaction and allow firms to 
improve firm value and move beyond institutional barriers (see Oliver, 1991). 
DiMaggio (1984); North (1990) echo similar views and indicate that institutional 
norms shape the nature of economic activity, motivate the behaviour of firms and 
their firm value. Yet, despite the massive economic and institutional reforms in China, 
we know very little regarding the effects of Chinese institutions on firm firm value. 
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No systematic study using a broad range of institutional variables has been carried out 
and prior studies have been limited to the effects of state ownership on firm value 
with inconclusive results (see Sun and Tong, 2003; Tian and Estrin, 2008; Cui and 
Jiang, 2012). The role played by the home country institutions in shaping international 
expansion behaviour have implications for firm value in that they affect the cost of 
doing business, firms’ confidence and create individual winners and losers in the 
marketplace (Kofele-Kale, 1992,  Leone, 1986; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Good 
institutions provide effective functioning of the market mechanisms enabling firms 
and individuals “to engage in market transaction without incurring undue costs or 
risks” (Meyer, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009:63; North, 1990) which is essential for firm’s 
value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This is because good institutions facilitate 
international transactions such as CBM&As whereas “bad” institutions act as a tax by 
increasing the cost of doing business (Ang and Michailova, 2008). In this study, we 
examine the effects of state ownership, home and host country institutions on the firm 
value of CBM&As by Chinese firms.  
We advance the institutional perspective to examine the effect of state ownership and 
institutional factors on firm value for a number of reasons:  Institutions have huge 
impact on emerging market firms’ behaviour in that government and societal 
influences are stronger in emerging market economies such as China and India 
compared to those in developed countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000). One of the key 
objectives of enterprise reforms in China and the ‘go abroad’ strategy (a national 
policy encouraging overseas investments by Chinese firms) initiated in 1999 is to 
reduce institutional constraints and help Chinese firms to become global champions.  
After two decades of market reforms and streamlining the outward investment 
institutions in China, it is appropriate we ask: to what extent do the institutions in 
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China increase corporate value? Second, Hitt et al. (2004) indicate that Chinese 
government’s authority over businesses is pervasive, institutional constraints and 
incentives are the bases for Chinese firms M&A decisions. State ownership 
unavoidably brings political objectives into corporate decision-making which can 
damage corporate value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). On the other hand, it is argued 
that state ownership of firms in China lead to preferential treatment from the 
government and favourable allocation of resources thereby enhancing the value of a 
firm. In order to address the relationship between state ownership, institutional 
variables and firm value, we focus on short-term acquirers’ returns as it is a direct 
measure of shareholder value which is consistent to the strategic goal of wealth 
maximisation of a firm (McGee, Thomas and Wilson, 2008). Moreover, acquirers’ 
returns measure the future expectations of investors. The results from the examination 
of firm’s share prices over a period of time therefore represent the optimum criterion 
for measuring corporate value.  
The focus of Chinese CBM&As as an empirical context to study the effects of 
institutional factors on firm value is motivated by the fact that: i) China is the largest 
emerging economy and CBM&A is growing exponentially and constitute a 
predominant foreign direct investment (FDI) entry strategy by Chinese firms to enter 
overseas markets (UNCTAD, 2012); ii) although Chinese economy has become 
diverse and plural (Rugman and Li, 2007), state-owned and -controlled firms remain 
the dominant force in the CBM&A activities (Chen and Young, 2010). The 
prevalence of state ownership allows us to capture its effect on firm value; iii) the 
institutional environment in China is unique, diverse and dynamic which makes it an 
ideal to test our hypotheses. Chinese CBM&As are worldwide and the home 
institutional changes vary across industries. Despite the massive reforms carried by 
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Chinese government, the state remains a dominant player and has maintained its 
ability to reward and discipline firms for their adherence to its directives (Luo, 2000). 
The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, it contributes to the 
institutional theory and its application in international finance research. By so doing, 
we provide better understanding of firm responses to the institutional pressures. Our 
study extends the theoretical development to firms which are both structurally 
affiliated and separated (SOEs and non SOEs) from Chinese institutions – a complete 
departure from previous studies such as Hsiang-Chun and Bo (2012); Tian and Estrin 
(2008) which concentrate on the effects of SOEs on firm value. 
Second, the study also contributes to empirical research on cross-border investment 
by emerging economy firms, especially from China. The surge of CBM&As which is 
the primary mode of foreign entry has attracted considerable research among strategy 
and finance academics (Deng, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; Boateng, Wang and Yang, 
2008). Yet the impact of institutional factors on corporate value is scarcely discussed. 
Our study addresses this research gap by shedding lights on the impact of state 
ownership and institutions on value creation of by Chinese acquirers. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The next part provides a brief 
theoretical and conceptual background of the study and reviews the prior literature on 
CBM&As. This is followed by the hypotheses of the study. We then discuss the data 
and research methodology used in this study.  Following that is the results and 





2. Theoretical Framework 
Over the past decade, institutional theory has emerged to be one of the most relevant 
theories when explaining the behaviour of firms in emerging markets (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005, Hoskisson et al., 2000; Buckley et al., 2007). Institutional theory 
suggests that institutional contexts - the combination of formal rules, informal 
constraints, and their enforcement characteristics create an impetus for action patterns 
in an organisation. Scott (1995) identified three pillars of institutional framework to 
encompass regulatory (i.e. existing laws and rules), cognitive (widely shared social 
knowledge and perceptions in society that are taken for granted), normative (i.e. 
social norms, values and cultures). These pillars together offer a broad basis to 
analyse a country’s institutional profile. As applied to management and finance 
research, the institutional based view maintains that firms are shaped by the home and 
host countries institutional environments. Firms require legitimacy on top of 
economic efficiency to survive and succeed (Scott, 1995). A firm makes strategic 
choices based on the interaction between institutions and organisation (Peng, 2002). It 
is therefore argued that besides the firm and industry level factors, firm needs to 
consider wider influences from sources such as the state and society when crafting 
and implementing its strategies to gain competitive advantage. In the context of China, 
government maintains strong influences on outward FDI activities. In the outward 
FDI, acquisition-sponsored and supported by state is becoming normal mode which 
the China-based enterprises enter and penetrate a host country in the world (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005). When conducting CBM&A activities, firms engage in institutional 
processes in both home and host countries (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002). The institutional pressures encountered in CBM&A transactions 
include: First, within the home country, firms are subject to the home government’s 
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regulatory restrictions on outward investments. For example, home country capital 
control for outward investments is prevalent in many emerging economies such as 
China (Cui and Jiang, 2010; Morck et al., 2008). Firms’ CBM&A decisions in China 
are influenced directly or indirectly by different levels of government, either through 
FDI incentives and support schemes or the government-administered approval system.  
The approval system entails costs which can affect the value of the firm. Similarly, 
host country institutions may also impact on firm’s value. Good host country 
institutions imply strong legal enforceability, which protect the interest of acquisitions 
parties involved and reduce cost implied by the asymmetric information. In sum, the 
quality of host and home institutions reduce uncertainties, constraints, cost of doing 
business and more importantly speed up the process of mergers and acquisitions to 
avoid the deal becoming hostile thereby leading to value destruction.  
The literature also highlights the effects of state ownership on firm value. The state 
ownership effects come from two channels. One view suggests that state-ownership 
damages corporate value because of government intervention which may slow down 
the decision-making process of the firm in an increasing competitive environment. On 
the contrary, it is argued that state owned firms are more likely to receive preferential 
treatment from government thereby enhancing their firm value (Blanchard and 
Shleifer, 2001). China, like other emerging economies, is characterised by active 
government involvement in business through ownership and regulation (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Scott, 2002). It is well-documented that Chinese firms engaged in 
CBM&As have benefited from government support through value-added tax and 
favourable financing (UNCTAD, 2005; Xiao and Sun, 2005). Prior literature has 
examined whether state ownership has beneficial and detrimental effects on Chinese 
firm value have produced mixed results (see Sun, Tong and Tong, 2002; Wei, Xie and 
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Zhang, 2005). We examine whether the institutions in China’s emerging market 
economy enhance or destroy value of Chinese firms engaged in CBM&As. This study 
is timely because the “go abroad” strategy initiated by the Chinese government, which 
actively provides financial and other support mechanisms to Chinese firms, has been a 
powerful force behind the surge in CBM&A activities. Moreover, the government ‘go 
abroad’ is being pursued on the assumption that these firms will bring in advanced 
technology, natural resources and managerial know-how that China lacks and help 
bolster the national economy and enhance national competitiveness which may be at 
variance with the shareholder value maximisation (Luo, 2001). 
Based on above institutional pressures and the Chinese institutional environment, we 
propose a conceptual model to analyse the impact of institutional variables on the 




2.1 Hypotheses Development 
State Ownership 
Corporatized State owned firms in China raises a problem of principal-principal 
governance conflicts in that the government as a shareholder may have different 
objectives distinct from other shareholders whose primary goal is firm value 
Institutional Theory 

































maximisation (Young et al, 2008). A number of scholars, including Walter and Howie 
(2003), Lau et al. (2007) and Chen and Young (2010), suggest that in China, political 
motives are central to the strategic decision-making of state-dominated firms rather 
than purely profit motives. As part of the economic reforms, the Chinese government 
has pursue a ‘go abroad’ policy since 1999 with the objectives of securing strategic 
resources which China lacks and improving Chinese firms’ ability to compete on the 
global stage. The government does so using Chinese firms mostly dominated by the 
central or local government. Chen and Young (2010) pointed out the pursuit of 
resource seeking motive or national pride instead of value maximization may have a 
negative effect on the acquirers’ returns. The state-controlled firms are a part of the 
home country institutions which pursue the state-directed goals such as foreign 
investment in areas designated as priority by the Chinese government to secure 
technology and scarce natural material resources which the country lacks and 
internalise them at home. Therefore, the firm value may not be based on value 
maximization of shareholders but the extent to which they secure the resources 
indicated by the state. 
On the other hand, it is argued that compared with privately owned firms, firms with 
state ownership have strong political ties with the government and face less financial 
constraints. Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2010) argue that ‘political 
pecking-order’ in credit allocation plays an important role in China. Using a data set 
of 20,000 Chinese firms, they concluded that private firms in China face severe 
financial constraints on investments while SOEs do not face such constraints. Guarilia, 
Liu and Song (2011) obtain similar results indicating that SOEs’ total assets growth, 
which encompasses firm investment, is not affected by cash flows. 
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In summary, the argument above suggests that firms with large state ownership in 
emerging economies are not or less subject to financial constraints and these firms 
still enjoy some degree of soft budget constraints. We argue that the political and 
economic advantages in terms of preferential treatment given to firms with large 
government stake may lead to increased firm value. This lead to our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Acquiring firms with dominant state-ownership will generate positive 
abnormal returns/value.  
Formal Institutional Distance 
Gubbi et al., (2010) argue that the potential for acquisitions to create value for 
emerging economy acquiring firms would vary across international markets, largely 
due to the differences in the quality of resources and institutional development in the 
host country markets where the acquisitions are made. Formal institutions allow firms 
to engage in market transactions without incurring undue costs or risks with positive 
effects on firm value (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009). Explaining this more 
explicitly, Berry, 2006: 1125) contend that, more institutionally developed markets 
are likely to provide, inter alia, “location with less risk….where knowledge can be 
acquired or learned, and to more institutional protection for investments”. It follows 
that acquisitions by emerging economy firms in institutional developed countries, 
characterised by competitive markets and customer-centric focus, are likely to offer a 
rich reservoir of learning for Chinese firms which lack cutting edge technology and 
other resources which can subsequently be internalised in different product markets 
and at home. Chan, Isobe and Makino (2008) pointed out that the enhanced learning 
experience offered by targets in more developed institutional environments will be of 
greater value to emerging economy firms. In a recent study by Gubbi et al., (2010) in 
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the context of India, they found a positive relationship between institutional distance 
and value creation of Indian acquirers. No study has explicitly examined the 
institutional distance in China, yet China as a former communist country has seen an 
unprecedented reforms over the past two decades. It would be interesting to examine 
the impact of institutional distance which captures the regulative and cognitive 
constructs between two economies on firm value. We therefore hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese acquirers engaged in CBM&A activities in developed 
institutional environment   will generate positive abnormal returns/value 
Exchange Rate Reforms 
Chinese government has attempted to create institutional environment which 
stimulates and facilitates effective policies towards outward investment, liberalise 
trade and finance (Wong & Chan, 2003). The central authorities have also changed 
foreign exchange regime to a ‘buy-to-use’ policy in place of ‘earn-to-use’ policy in 
early 1990s (Voss, Buckley & Cross, 2010). The Chinese government employed a 
simplified application approval process in 2003 with the purpose of providing a 
speedy and smooth process to firms undertaking overseas mergers and acquisitions. In 
2006, central authorities further liberalised regulatory process and foreign exchange 
control by completely decentralising the system from the State Council to the 
provincial level with the quota of US $5 billion local limit abolished (Wu and Sia, 
2002; Voss, Buckley and Cross, 2010).  We argue that liberalisation of the exchange 
reduce bureaucracy and generate positive wealth effect when acquisitions are 
announced due to potential reduction in the costs of doing business. It is expected that 
the ensuing efficiencies associated with the reforms in the exchange rate system may 
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lead to value for Chinese acquirers on assumption that the stock markets in China are 
efficient. We therefore test the following hypothesis: 
H3: Chinese acquirers engaged in CBM&As will create more wealth after the reforms 
in foreign exchange approval systems.  
Informal Institutional Distance (Culture) 
Prior literature documents that informal institutions have a significant impact on 
CBM&As firm value. It is argued that the cultural proximity improves the firm value 
of cross-border M&As by offering access to the acquirers’ and targets’ diverse set of 
routines which are embedded in national culture (Hofstede, 1980; Morosini et al., 
1998). On the other hand, a number of researchers suggest that significant culture 
differences between the home country and host country is negatively associated with 
the firm value of cross-border M&As and such impact can happen in the pre-
acquisition phase (Hofstede, 1980; Kogut and Singh, 1988) and post-acquisition phase 
(Geringer et al., 1989). In terms of pre-acquisition culture impact, significant culture 
differences can be the source of acquired firm management resistance at the time of 
CBM&As which can increase the costs of transaction (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993) 
and thus lowering the value creation for acquiring firms. In term of post-acquisition, 
significant culture differences increase the difficulty in post-acquisition assimilation 
and in the transfer of distinctive competencies between the acquirers and targets 
(Geringer et al., 1989; Datta and Puia, 1995). Thus, the bigger the culture difference is, 
the more difficult for acquiring firms to gain normative legitimacy as measured by 
informal institutions in the host country. One of the main reasons for the failure of 
TCL of China acquisition of TV Business of Thomson in France was unfamiliarity 
with the business operations in Europe. According to Peng (2010: 520) “the new 
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company did not work well with people from different cultures, with difference 
experiences, and with different routines.” It is argued that, the higher the cultural 
differences between the two countries, the higher the acquirers’ value would be 
destroyed. Accordingly, the following hypothesis addresses the impact of culture 
proximity on the acquirers’ returns:  
Hypothesis 4: High culture distance between China and the target host country has a 
negative effect on the Chinese acquirers’ returns.  
4.  Data and Research Methodology 
4.1 Data Source 
This study considers all completed cross-border M&As by publicly traded Chinese 
firms over the period January 1998 to December 2011 from CSMAR of GTA 
database in HK. For each acquisition, GTA database furnishes information regarding 
the acquirer name, announcement date, target name, target country of origin, deal 
value, deal type, restructuring type, industry, and other details. There were several 
factual errors and missing information in terms of deal value and target country of 
origin in GTA database and the information was further cross-checked with firm 
annual report, newspapers, business magazines, and China mergers and acquisitions 
yearbook. Share price data was also collected from CSMAR of GTA database which 
provides daily share prices of all the public firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange 





4.2 Sample Selection 
The sample selection procedure for analysing Chinese acquirers’ returns begins with 
the universe of Chinese listed firms conducted cross-border M&As transactions from 
January 1998 to December 2011. CSMAR of GTA database reported a total of 1063 
cross-border M&As activities to construct the base set. Table 1 reports how the 
sample was selected. For inclusion in the final sample, the following restrictions were 
imposed on the acquiring firms:    
(i) The acquirer must be listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges under A share 
which provides data on CBM&As in China and the company shares must be actively 
traded; 
(ii) Neither the acquirer nor the target should be a financial firm. All the firms that belong 
to the financial sectors, such as banks, life assurance, investment firms, insurance and 
real estate investment trusts are excluded from the sample. The reason behind this is 
that financial firms have different nature of assets and liabilities, different financial 
reporting system and its unique regulations which may influence the firm value and 
biased the results;  
(iii) The acquirer must not be involved in multiple acquisitions within three months to 
separate effects of each acquisition properly; 
(iv) There should not be a contaminating announcement within 30 business days before or 
after the announcement. The reason is that other event around acquisition may also 
influence the stock price which may lead to biased result of acquisition firm value; 
(v) The acquirer must acquire more than 10% of the target since according to US 
Department of Commerce, acquiring interest less than 10% is classified as portfolio 
investment rather than acquisitive investment with managerial control;  
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(vi) The share price data and accounting information of acquirer must be available on 
CSMAR database. 
Table 1: Derivation of Initial Sampling Frame 
Description Number of CBM&As 
1998 - 2011 
Total number of Chinese cross-border M&As 1063 
Exclude non-listed firms 7 
Exclude non-A shares from Shanghai 36 
Exclude non-A shares from Shenzhen 43 
Exclude financial firms 15 
Exclude multiple acquisitions within 3 months 156 
Exclude contamination event within 30 days prior to and after 
acquisition 
122 
Exclude acquisitions less than 10% 199 
Exclude inadequate stock prices 360d before CBMAs 17 
Total usable sample 468 
 
The imposition of these restrictions led to the final usable sample consisted of 468 
cross-border acquisitions by Chinese bidders. It is important to point out that the data 
from CSMAR database was compared with Thomson SDC Platinum M&A database 
and Datastream. CSMAR database appears to provide relatively more up-to-date 
information in terms of number of acquisitions and stock returns with fewer missing 
values. To achieve the objective of examining the short-term acquirers’ returns in this 
study, this study adopted event study methodology. The principle behind the event 
study is to compare the actual return with the normal return which was calculated by 
market model parameters to analyse acquirers’ abnormal returns. In order to get 
individual firm returns, in line with the past precedent (Gubbi et al., 2010), this study 
used daily adjusted share prices for each sample firms. Prior literature suggests that 
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daily share prices enable scholars to isolate the market’s response to a certain event at 
event date more effectively. The daily data lowers the possibility of biased estimated 
returns by extraneous events. A sample size of 468 transactions is sufficiently large 
and hence an assumption of normality, which is a critical concern in event study 
methodology (Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003; Gubbi et al., 2010).  
4.3 Data Analysis 
Event study (Cumulative Abnormal Returns) 
This study used market response to the announcement, i.e. event study to examine the 
short-term acquirers’ returns of Chinese cross-border M&As. Event study allows 
researchers to examine whether there are abnormal share prices returns associated 
with an event. The event date in this study is set to be the announcement data of each 
M&As event. According to McWilliams & Siegel (1997), the most important issue of 
research design is to determine the length of event window. McWilliams & Siegel 
(1997) suggest the length of event window should be short enough to enhance the 
power of the analysis and sufficiently large to incorporate the full impact of the event. 
Based on the above argument and the prior studies on cross-border M&As, this study 
used a both relatively short event windows (-1,1; -1,3; -2,2) and two relatively long 
event windows (-5, 5);-10, 10). 








− 1                               (2) 
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Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the daily return of stock 𝑖 at day 𝑡, while 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 refers the closed 
price of stock 𝑖 at day 𝑡.  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represents the daily return of the market at day 𝑡, while 
𝑃𝑚,𝑡 refers the closed market index ratio at day 𝑡.  
Then the regression of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 to 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is accessed, using the data a relatively long period 
before the announcement day.  
                        (3) 
Where, 
𝑡 = day measured relative to event, 
𝛼𝑖 = estimated period intercept of firm 𝑖, 
𝛽𝑖 = OLS estimates of firm 𝑖’s market model parameters of the relationship between 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡,  
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index (a 
proxy for the market portfolio of risky assets), 
𝜀𝑖𝑡= the random error of firm 𝑖 on the sample event day 𝑡, 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =return on firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 
The market model is used to estimate the returns on the stock that would have been 
expected on the event day (the day of acquisition announcement), or during a certain 
event window around event day if the event had not happen. In this study, this return 
is estimated by using a 340-day estimation period from 𝑡=-21 to 𝑡=-360, where 𝑡=0 is 
the event day.  
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The abnormal return (AR) due to the acquisition announcement for each firm 𝑖 on day 
𝑡 thus equals the actual return minus the estimated normal return and is calculated as 
follows:  
                    (4) 
Where, 
𝑡 = day measured relative to event, 
𝛼𝑖 = estimated period intercept of firm 𝑖, 
𝛽𝑖 = OLS estimates of firm 𝑖’s market model parameters of the relationship between 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡,  
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange     Composite Index 
(a proxy for the market portfolio of risky assets), 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =return on firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = excess return on firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡. 
Daily abnormal returns are then estimated for each day 𝑡 for each firm 𝑖. 
In order to see clearly and gain a general insight into the abnormal return observations 
for a sample of 𝑁 firms, the daily abnormal return should be replaced by the average 
abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The daily 













,                            (5) 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the average abnormal return for the period from 𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 1  until 
𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑛. Since the full effect of an event on firm stock price may not be reflected 
on a single day, event study often estimates the return for a period around an event, 
which is called the event window.  
In this study, the event window is defined as the period between 20 days prior to the 
event and 20 days ex post the event. The predicted return on the stock calculated from 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 during the event window (-20, 20) are compared with the actual stock return 
observed on each day within the event window and the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return during the event window is called cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR). In equation, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, is estimated by summing average abnormal returns 









                           (6) 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulated abnormal return for the period from 𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 1 until 
𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑛. 












                     (7) 
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where 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative average abnormal return over the time period from 
𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 1 until 𝑡 = 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑛. 





                (8) 
Where, 
(𝐷1, 𝐷2) is the event window, 
𝑆𝐷𝑖 is calculated according to 










               (9) 
Where, 
𝑆𝑖 = the standard error of the market model regression,  
𝑀 = the number of observations in the estimation period,  
𝑅𝑚𝑡 = the return on the market portfolio for day t,  
𝑅𝑚 = the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period,  
𝑘 = the number of days in the event window.  






𝑖=1                              (10) 
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Cross-sectional Regression of SCARs 
It is well documented in the literature that value creation of CBM&As is influenced 
by a number of firm level, industry level and country level factors. The meta-analysis 
of both domestic and CBM&As studies indicate that “the wide variance surrounding 
the association between M&As activity and subsequent firm value suggests subgroups 
of firms do experience significant, positive returns from such activity. Existing models 
have failed to clearly identify these groups” (King et al., 2004:196) To explain 
whether Chinese institutions influence the cumulative abnormal returns of Chinese 
firm which conducted CBM&As, we use the following regression model:  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5,5) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛) + 𝛽2(𝐹𝐼𝑛𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) +
𝛽4(𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)  + 𝜀                                                                                    (11) 
Control Variables 
Following the M&A literature, several control measures were included in the 
regression model. First, we control the sectors in line with the study of Doukas and 
Travlos (1988), who reported wealth gains across different sectors. We used two 
dummy variables to control the influences of manufacturing and primary sectors. The 
prior experience of the Chinese acquirer conducting M&A activity overseas may 
influence the firm’s perceived risk and uncertainty as well as the willingness to 
commit resources and consequently the firm value. Standard corporate finance theory 
describes a common corporate governance problem whereby management excessively 
retains earnings and invests them into low-return projects to build corporate empires. 
For example, substantial cash holdings could serve managers’ personal interests 
because large holdings of cash could lead managers to invest unproductively (Jensen, 
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1986) or to undertake value-decreasing acquisitions (Hartford, 1999). We expect the 
cash holdings of the acquiring firm to have impact on the firm value. Acquirer size 
indicates the firm’s capability to generate gains through the economies of scale and 
scope, and consequently the higher returns for acquirers (King et al., 2004; Moeller et 
al., 2004). Asquith et al., (1983), and Houston and Ryngaert (1994), find that the 
average wealth gains to the bidders increase significantly as target size increases. We 
therefore include deal size as a control variable. Acquisition relatedness may create 
market power for the acquiring firm by increasing the absolute size and breadth of the 
firm (Singh and Montgomery, 1987) and consequently enhancing firm value through 
economies of scale. Prior studies suggest that regional domicile have impact on value 
creation of acquirers (Kiymaz, 2004; Aybar and Ficci, 2009). Accordingly, we 
include three dummy variables for North America, Europe, and Asia to control the 
effects of the geographical origin of target. CBM&As by Chinese firms are primarily 
motivated by market development and to obtain foreign advanced technology and 
natural resources (Boateng, Wang and Yang, 2008: Deng, 2008). The Chinese 
government, through its “go abroad” policy, has classified some sectors as strategic1; 
these sectors receive more active support, and firms that conform to the direction of 
government policies can more readily access inputs, such as cheaper sources of funds, 
and other incentives. We expect firms investing in priority sectors to obtain more 
preferential treatment thereby invoking a favourable response from the markets. In 
                                                          
1
 In recent years, an expressed goal of state-directed Chinese overseas direct investment has been to 
access advanced proprietary technology; natural resources and other immobile strategic assets and 
other capabilities (Deng, 2003; Cai, 1999; Wu and Sia, 2002). The Chinese government provides 
support in the form of information on obstacles and problems encountered by OFDI firms, lower 
lending rate credit funds for companies engaged in acquisitions for the following: i) energy; natural 
resources in mining, gas and oil, textiles; and transport and communication manufacturing. The priority 
sector in this study include: minerals, petroleum, fishery, agriculture products, textiles; motor, 




order to account for this distinct possibility, we collated additional data in respect of 
priority sectors. We therefore control priority sector using a dummy variable. 
 
Our second regression equation is as follows:  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5,5) =
𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛) + 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽3(𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽4(𝐸𝑥𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) +
𝛽5(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑐) + 𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1) + 𝛽7(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2) + 𝛽8(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒) + 𝛽9(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑙𝑑) +
𝛽10(𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽11(𝐿𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 𝛽12(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽13(𝑁𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎) +
𝛽14(𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒) + 𝛽15(𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎) + 𝜀          (12) 
Variables Measurement 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
We employ stock market reaction to the announcement, as reflected in the firm’s 
share price movement around the announcement of the M&A event. We chose 
shareholder wealth creation for the following reasons: i) it is widely accepted in 
finance literature that the goal of a firm is to maximise the wealth of its shareholders, 
which is measured by stock prices, and prior studies in finance and strategic 
management have extensively used market reaction in M&A studies (see Delong, 
2001; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; McGee, Thomas and Wilson, 2005); ii) 
Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan (2006) and Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002), point out 
that share price movement has a better predictive validity than other objective 
measures such as profitability, in that it is an ex-ante firm value measure that has been 
found to correlate with ex-post firm value; and iii) share price movement is relatively 
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unbiased compared to other measures and invariant to differences in accounting 
policies across nations (Cording, Christmann and King, 2008). We measure the M&A 
short-term firm value of Chinese acquirers using the standardised cumulative 
abnormal returns (SCARs) for the event window -5, 5 period. 
The manner in which the independent variables are measured is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Definition of Independent Variables 
 Definition Expected 
Effect 
   
 
State Ownership & 
Institutional Variables 
  
  𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑶𝒘𝒏 
(State Ownership) 
Percentage of equity ownership to total 
equity by the central government, local 
government, and its agencies, institutions 
held in a Chinese firm (Lin et al., 1997; 
Xu and Zhang, 2008). Data on firm 




  𝑰𝒏𝒔𝑫𝒊𝒔  
 (Formal Institutional 
distance) 
Differences in the institutions between 
the two economies using International 
Country Risk Index. For each target 
country in our sample, we divide the 
value for selected indicator for that year 
by a corresponding value for China, and 
take the mean across the indicators such 
as democratic accountability, government 
stability, investment climate, corruption, 
law and order, bureaucratic quality to 
obtain the final value. Values>1 signify 
higher and those <1 reflect lower levels 
of institutional development relative to 
China (Gubbi et al., 2010) 
+ 
  + 
  𝑬𝒙𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆   
(Exchange Rate Reforms) 
A dummy variable representing exchange 
rate reforms policy is constructed. 
Indicator equals 1 if the CBM&A 
transaction is conducted during the 
period 1998-June, 2006 with fixed 
exchange rate policy, and afterwards 




system for outward investment was 
abolished. 
 
  𝑪𝒖𝒍𝑫𝒊𝒔  
(Culture Distance)  
We use a cultural distance index based 
on Hofstede’s culture dimensions, 
namely, power distance, individuality, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and 
long-term orientation ( long-term 
orientation excluded from calculation for 
lack of data). For each target country in 
our sample, we divide the value for the 
selected cultural index category for that 
year by corresponding value for China 
and taking the mean across the four ratios 
thus obtained as the final value. 
Values >1 signify higher and those<1 






  𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝟏 Dummy variable indicating 
Manufacturing sector =1; 0=otherwise 
+/- 
  𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝟐  1 = firms from Primary sectors, 0 
=otherwise 
+/- 
  + 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆  
(Prior Experience) 
Number of prior foreign acquisitions 





A dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
acquirer and target are in similar business 
and 0 otherwise 
 
+ 
  𝑫𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  
(Deal Size) 




 𝑳𝑨𝒄𝒒𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆  
(Log of Acquirer’s total 
assets) 
 





Ratio of cash and cash equivalents  to 
total assets.  
 
     - 
  𝑵𝑨𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒂 
(North America) 
Dummy variable indicating North 
America =1; 0 =otherwise 
- 
  𝑬𝒖𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒆 Dummy variable indicating that 
 target is located in Europe =1; 
 0 = otherwise 
- 
  𝑨𝒔𝒊𝒂 Dummy variable indicating that 
 target is located in Asia =1; 




5. Results and Discussion 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations. A number of interesting 
observations are worth a comment. Mean of formal institutional distance between 
home and host countries is 6.4418, suggesting that the bulk of these cross-border 
M&As took place in countries with suggesting significant institutional distance in 
relation with China.  The mean of state ownership of 57.8 percent in the acquisitions 
suggests that on the average the government ownership constitutes a majority stake in 
most of the firms engaged in CBM&As. The log of the average size in terms of deal 
size and acquiring firm size are 2.0326 and 12.530 billion respectively indicating that 
the deals and firms involved are large ones. All the correlation are fairly low, and 
variance inflation factor scores are well within the cut-off point of 10 as 
recommended by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1985). Multicollinearity appears not 









Table  3. Summary Statistics and Pearson correlation Matrix of dependent and independent variables 
Variables MEAN SD A B C D E F G H I J K L M             O           P   
A. CAR_-5, 5 
 
0.6695 .487 1.00                
B. FInstDis 
 
6.4418             0.2631 .030 1.00               
C. StateOwn 
 
0.578             0.1447  .137**
* 
.190*** 1.00              
D. ExRate 
 
0.89              0.318 .076* .585*** -.158** 1.00             
E. CInstDis 
 
0.3277 0.0042 .010 .172** -.072 .184*** 1.00            
F. Sector1 
 
0.34            0.474 -.086** .024 .081 .035 .147** 1.00           
G. Sector2  
 
0.13              0.332 -.044 .095** -.050 .138*** -.043 .030 1.00          
H. PriorSec 0.40              
 
0.490 -.018* -.017 .007 .075* .119 .427*** .455*** 1.00         
I. Experience 
 




.043 -.089* .022 .040 -.007 
 
.007 1.00        
J. CashHld 
 
17.23                 13.15 -.035 .183*** -.049 .121*** .118** .067 -.024 .063 .019 1.00       
K. Relatedness 
 
0.38               0.486 -.000 .031 .036 .070 .202** .273*** .021 .263*** .041 .043 1.00      
L. DealSize 
 
2.033                 0.2174 .085 .056 -.132 .003 -.059 -.011 .012 .000 .081 .003 .045 1.00     
M. LAquSize 
 
12.530             .0.48498 -.071 .247*** -.084 .237*** .157** .079* .144*** .084* .106* -.098** .127 .139*** 1.00    
N.Asia 0. 63          0.482 .004 .137*** .109** -.116** .480** .100** -.019 -.091* .003 .017 -.045 -.114* .197*** 1.00   
                   
O. N.America 0.11 0.317 .040 .002 -.035 -.043 .217** .027 .007 .049 .081 -.056 .091 .030 .066 .472*** 1.00  
                   
P. Europe 0.16 .368 .006 .122*** .063 .115** .408** .158*** -.026 .073 -.081 .023 .041 .062 .136*** .575*** .353***  
                   
Notes: No. of sample: 468; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 4A reports the standardized average abnormal returns (SAARs) and standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns (SCARs) for a sample of 468 Chinese cross-border M&As. The average abnormal 
return for event window (-5, 5) shows that the Chinese acquirers create a positive and significant 
value in the 5 days following the announcement. The SAARs on the announcement day is 0.1503% 
and is statistically significant at 1% level. The SAARs on 1 to 5 days are 0.0888%, 0.1190%, 
0.1772%, 0.0915% and 0.0766% and all of them are statistically significant. The result shown in 
Table indicates that the Chinese acquirers engaged in CBM&As experienced positive wealth gains 
in the short term. The significant daily return on day -1 (0.2380%), day -3 (0.1061%) and day -5 
(0.1533) may result from information leakage before the announcement.   
Table 4: Standardized Average Abnormal Returns (SAARs) and Standardized  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (SCARs) of CBM&As by Chinese Acquirers 
A. Event Days SAARs  Z-statistic p-value 
-5 0.1533 3.3033 0.0010*** 
-4 -0.0046 -0.0983 0.9217 
-3 0.1061 2.2874 0.0222** 
-2 0.0711 1.5315 0.1256 
-1 0.2380 5.1282 0.0000*** 
0 0.1503 3.2394 0.0012*** 
1 0.0888 1.9143 0.0556* 
2 0.1190 2.5644 0.0103** 
3 0.1772 3.8191 0.0001*** 
4 0.0915 1.9724 0.0486** 
5 0.0766 1.6516 0.0986* 
 























CAR (-1,1) 0.4771 5.1280 2.93E-07*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. The table resents the 
daily standardized abnormal returns and standardized cumulative abnormal returns of 468 cross-border M&As 




Table 4.B presents the standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCARs) for Chinese acquirers for 
five different windows which are (-10, 10); (-5, 5); (-2, 2); (-1, 3) and (-1, 1). For all the 5 windows, 
the results show that announcement of CBM&As by Chinese firms create value for Chinese 
acquirers. Positive returns for all the 5 event windows range from 0.4771% to 1.5210 and all the 
returns are statistically significant at 1% level. Overall, the positive responses indicate that investors 
regard CBM&As by Chinese firms as value-creating strategies. This result is consistent with the 
similar findings by Boateng et al. (2008) and Gibbi et al. (2010) who find that CBM&As by 
Chinese and Indian firms respectively create wealth of the acquirers. However, the results are at 
variance with the conclusions drawn by Click and Harrison (2000) and Aybar and Ficici (2009).   
In order to test the impact of state ownership and institutional factors on the short-term firm value 
of Chinese cross-border M&As, we carried out multiple regression of SCARs on the explanatory 
and control variables. Table 5 reports the cross-sectional regression results regarding the impacts of 
state ownership and institutional variables on Chinese acquirers’ SCARs. Across the four regression 
models (1- 4), the state ownership and institutional variables have results which are highly 
significant. The F-values of the four regressions are statistically highly significant. The adjusted R² 
range from 9.9% to 11.3%, suggesting that, the regression procedure explains the variation in the 
change in firm value of Chinese acquirers. The total amount of variation explained by the model 
appears reasonable and compares favourably to other CBM&A studies, such as Gubbi et al., 2010; 
Kiymaz, (2004) who obtained an overall Adjusted R square ranging between 4% and 12% for their 
studies of acquirer and target firms’ value for CBM&As.  The coefficient of the three variables, 
state ownership, formal institutional distance and exchange rate reforms in models 1 to 4 are 
significantly positive, indicating that the Chinese government and institutions play a significant role 
in the value creation of Chinese acquirers. The results provide support for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
Regarding the informal institutional (cultural) distance, the results indicate that the coefficient is 
positive and but not statistically significant. Hypothesis 4 is therefore unsupported. The results that 
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state ownership influences the value creation of the Chinese acquiring firms may be explained by 
the fact that Chinese acquirers with large state ownership stake appear to enjoy some degree of soft 
budget constraints and other preferential treatment despite the enterprise reforms over the past two 
decades. This result appears surprising in that a number of researchers such as Chen and Young 
(2010) argue that Chinese firms with dominant state ownership tend to pursue political objectives 
such as resource seeking rather than shareholder value and financial motives. Another important 
finding relates to the impact of the liberalisation of the currency approval system on firm value of 
Chinese acquirers. The results suggest that decentralising the currency approval system on outward 
investment appears beneficial to Chinese firms engaged in international acquisitions. The results 
support the notion that liberalising the currency approval procedures reduces bureaucracy and the 
costs of doing business, thereby generating positive wealth effects when acquisitions are announced. 
The results of formal institutional distance support our contention that abnormal returns accruing to 
the shareholder of the acquiring firms tend to increase with the level of institutional development of 
host country relative to China, reflecting the availability of higher-quality complementary resources 
and capability. The positive coefficient of culture distance across the four models suggests that the 
informal institutions such as norms, beliefs and values do not exert a statistically significant 
influence on value creation of Chinese acquirers. It was expected that the cultural distance between 
the China and target countries would be high leading to high transaction costs and lower firm value 
but this appears not to be the case. The results may be explained by the extent to which China has 
bridged the gap between other foreign countries due to the fact that most of the managers in these 
firms are Western educated Chinese with deep understanding of the informal institutions in western 
countries hence the variable being positive but insignificant. Technological advancement may have 
also played a big role in bridging the cultural distance between China and the rest of the world. The 
results for the control variables suggest that sector 1 representing manufacturing, priority sector and 
firm relatedness have positive and significant influence on Chinese acquiring firm value with the 
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rest of the variables indicating no significant influence. The positive coefficient of the priority 
sector variable indicates a positive and significant relationship between the state-backed sectors and 
wealth gains. This finding is interesting suggesting that, Chinese government through its investment 
policy framework relentlessly pursue certain long-term objectives to help Chinese firms acquire the 
resources they lack and thereby create value for these acquirers. The result is consistent with the 
point made by Rui and Yip (2008) who argue that, Chinese firms strategically use CBM&As to 
achieve specific goals, such as acquiring strategic resources and capabilities to offset their 
competitive weaknesses through the use of government support and other incentives and 
minimisation of institutional constraints. Conforming to the state-directed policy to acquire strategic 
assets therefore helps these firms to gain legitimacy, social and financial support from state, which, 












Table 5:Cross-sectional regression result: State Ownership, Institutions & Acquirers’ Returns 
Variables Model 1               Model 2 Model 3            Model 4 
Constant -8.155 -2.810 -1.941            -1.425 
 (-1.184)* (-0.255) (-0.181)           (-0.120) 
State Ownership & 
Institutional Variables 
   
 State Ownership 0.255 0.255 0.259               0.251 
 (4.679)*** (4.634)** (4.649)***       (4.467)*** 
 Cultural Distance 0.082 0.088 0.058               0.059 
 (1.464) (1.557) (1.010)***       (1.045)*** 
 Formal Inst Distance 0.141 0.124 0.138                0.131 
 (2.570)*** (2.214)** (2.419)**         (2.306)** 
 Exchange Rate Reforms 0.180 0.167 0.170                0.166 
 (3.272)*** (2.990)*** (2.978)***        (2.907)** 
Control Variables:    
 Sector 1  0.093 0.092 - 
  (1.626)* (1.555)* 
 Sector 2  -0.012 -                          - 
  (-0.222)  
Priority Sector                                 0.103 
                                (1.745)** 
Prior Experience   0.024                 0.026 
   (0.416)              (0.464) 
 CashHld  -0.026 -0.028                - 0.027 
  (-0.047) (-0.491)              (-0.470) 
Relatedness  0.074 0.098                 0.103 
  (1.293)* (1.671)*               (1.758)* 
DSize  0.066   0.062                 0.065 
  (1.195)   (1.093)              (1.157) 
 LAcqSize  -0.057 --0.069                -0.068 
     (-0.998)   (-1.175)              (-.1.170) 
 North America   -0.051                -0.052 
   (-0.779)              (-0.900) 
 Europe   -0.047                 -0.047 
   (-0.594)              (-0.820) 
 Asia   -0.014                    - 
   (-0.166)                   - 
R² 0.108 0.13.2 0.148                  0.150 
Adjusted R² 0.099 0.103 0.108                  0.113 
F-value 9.767*** 4.520*** 3.692***           4.073*** 
    
Notes: 1.Following the work of Kiymaz (2004), we used standardised cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (SCAR) for the (-5, 5) period as a dependent variable.  
2.  *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 







To check the robustness of our models, we employed several additional specifications to rule out 
alternative explanations. Table 6 summarises the analysis for the sake of readability and brevity. 
Table 6: Additional Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Issue                       Test performed          Specification                         Findings 
Inter-temporal variation    Split sample event         Data relating to the          Mean abnorma 
in abnormal gains to          study test                       1998-2004 (first-half)       returns in the 1st  
shareholders (McNamara,                                        and data relating to the       half (N=84) and  
Haleblian & Dykes, 2008)                                      2005-2011 (second half)   2
nd
  half (N=384) 
                                                                                                                            are both positive 
                                                                                                                            and significant 
 
Structural changes caused       Chow test of            data pertaining to 1998-   No significant changes 
by changes in forex approval  differences               June 2006 and data          in the parameters  
 system CBM&As                                                    pertaining to July 2006   between two periods 
                                                                                  - 2011                              
 
Efficiency of information         Event study tests    4-, 7-, and 11-day period    No significant  
Dissemination in the stock       with alternate          as alternatives                    quantitative difference 
Market announcement (Miller, window periods                                                observed 
Li, Eden & Hitt, 2008) 
 
Self-selection of advanced        Differences of mean      Excess of “expected”     No significant  
market targets by                      test in the absence of     normal returns over the   difference 
Outperformers                          event for firms making   actual market returns 
                                                  Developed/developing   in the event window 
                                                  Market acquisitions 
 
Abnormal gains                        Test of difference          SCARs (-5,5; -2,2, -1,3)  Significant 
SOEs versus non-SOEs             (t-test)                          event windows; SOEs     differences between 
                                                                                         Versus non-SOEs         SOEs and non-SOEs 
                                                                                                                               in all event windows 
 
Priority Sectors and                   Test of differences     SCARs (-5,5; -2,2, -1,3)  Statistically and 
abnormal gains                            (t-test & Chi  test)    event windows                 positive significant  
                                                                                                                               differences between 
                                                                                                                               priority sector and 
non-priority sector 






This study has investigated the value creation implications of CBM&As by Chinese acquirers 
during the 1998-2011 time frame. Using a sample of 468 acquisition announcements by Chinese firms 
involving targets from the North America., Europe and Asia, this paper makes significant contributions on 
two fronts. First, this study has implications for the mergers and acquisition literature in that evidence 
on CBM&As as a value-accretive strategy is mixed and inconclusive (Reuer, Shenkar and 
Ragozzino, 2004, Seth et al., 2002; Shimizu et al., 2004; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Morck and 
Yeung, 1991; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). King et al. (2005:196) suggest that prior studies 
have failed to identify contextual conditions under which acquisitions create value for acquiring 
firms. We find evidence of positive abnormal returns for Chinese acquirers and identify the 
contextual factors under which CBM&As create value. Our findings indicate that the average 
abnormal returns for Chinese bidders range from 0.4771% - 1.5210% over the 10-day event 
window, suggesting that equity markets react positively to acquisition announcements and that 
Chinese firms are perceived, on average, to create value for shareholders.The cross-sectional 
analysis results indicate that value creation through acquisitions by Chinese acquiring firms is 
influenced by the formal institutional distance, reforms in exchange rate approval systems and state 
ownership suggesting that governments and institutions play a decisive role in CBM&A value 
creation. The implication here is that specific reforms, such as easing restrictions on currency for 
outward investments and state ownership improve firm value. We therefore suggest that the 
government should take additional steps to further reduce other restrictions on outward investments. 
In contrast, despite our expectation of negative impact of informal institutional distance on 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns, we find the results to be positive but not significant. 
Another significant finding of this study is that Chinese firms making investment in sectors 
considered strategic by Chinese government tend to create value for acquirers. This supports the 
contention that emerging country governments do not only shape international expansion strategies 
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of firms but also provide opportunities for significant value-creating activities, which correlate 
positively with market expectations. Another contribution is that, this study adds to the growing 
stream of literature on emerging economy firms by empirically testing the theoretical arguments 
relating to the institutional theory and firm value. Our study contributes some important insights to 
how national governments and institutional pressures on emerging economy firms to expand can 
also lead to value creation. 
While our research constitutes an important attempt to explore international expansion and value 
creation utilising framework, its limitation should be noted. Although, the event study methodology 
has wide application in finance, it is pertinent to point out that, it is based on the assumption that 
stock markets are semi-strong form under efficient market hypothesis. Hence, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. The event study reflects the market evaluation of complex, and in some 
cases infrequent, strategic initiatives. It may be possible that the value implications of such complex 
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